Rule Management

Sentio SIEM comes equipped with pre-defined rules out of the box, so when you’re setting up the SIEM, you won’t need to create rules from scratch. Cybersift Detection Engineering team proactively creates and tunes these alerts for all your log sources.


Sentio current supports various log sources which can be found on rules.cybersift.io. Don’t see the log source you need? Send us an email at support@cybersift.io and we’ll start supporting your log source!

Introduction

Sentio SIEM gives you visibility and control over all the rules provided by Cybersift, which are automatically turned on by default. These rules can be disabled/modified according to your infrastructure needs.

Rule Management Page

Rule Management Page


Apart from the rules listed above, Sentio comes equipped with various other Machine Learning rules and proprietary detection rules to further enhance the detection capabilities and identify zero-day threats.


Detection Rules

Terms: SOC Defined Rules are Cybersift Created rules, whilst User Defined Rules are the rules you create for your environment.

Creating Custom Rules

To create a custom detection rule, simply fill the details about your rule such as;

  • Title

    • A friendly name for your rule.

  • Log Query Source

    • Which index do you wish to search

  • Severity

  • JMESPath Query

    • The expression of your detection rule in JMESPath format.

      • Please ensure that your query also accounts for null values by using to_string() for each field.


Once your rule is setup, it will generate an alert within the alerts-* index.


Enabling / Disabling SOC Defined Rules

Cybersift’s Detection Rules are generic to all environments, meaning that they are applicable out of the box to all types of environments. Sometimes you might come across a detection rule in which is frequently triggering and/or not relevant to your environment


In these types of cases, you can easily disable the rule by clicking the 👁️‍🗨️ (Eye) icon on right side of the detection rule. This will disable the detection rule. You can always revert and re-enable at any time.



Modifying SOC Defined Rules

To modify an existing SOC Defined Rule, simply click the “Copy” button on the detection rule and modify the the JMESPath expression.


Once modified, save the detection rule and disable the original one.




If you need more context or want to know how to investigate a Detection Rule, refer to the Engineering section.


Filtering Rules

Filtering Rules allow you to filter out any irrelevant logs or alerts in your environment, these are especially useful to

  • Tune alerts

  • Save safe by filtering out irrelevant / non-security logs


Filtering Rules work by identifying the Log Query source of which you wish to filter the logs in, and creating the appropriate JMESPath expression matching the log event you wish to filter out.

Example [Filtering Out Windows Logs]

Taking the below JSON log as an example, if you wanted to filter out any logs matching the winlog.event_data.WorkstationName to FOOBAZ, your expression will look like

Query Log Source: Windows

JMESPath:

winlog.event_data.WorkstationName=='FOOBAZ'

{
    "@timestamp": "2024-10-21T13:08:53.874Z",
    "@metadata": {
      "beat": "winlogbeat",
      "type": "_doc",
      "version": "7.15.0"
    },
    "event": {
      "action": "Logon",
      "created": "2024-10-21T13:08:55.081Z",
      "code": "4624",
      "kind": "event",
      "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
      "outcome": "success"
    },
    "log": {
      "level": "information"
    },
    "message": "An account was successfully logged on.\n\nSubject:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\n\tAccount Name:\t\tFOOBAZ$\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tWORKGROUP\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\n\nLogon Type:\t\t\t2\n\nImpersonation Level:\t\tImpersonation\n\nNew Logon:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-2224737262-2903874594-3848241394-500\n\tAccount Name:\t\tAdministrator\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tFOOBAZ\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x1BF7DA\n\tLogon GUID:\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\n\nProcess Information:\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x234\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe\n\nNetwork Information:\n\tWorkstation Name:\tFOOBAZ\n\tSource Network Address:\t127.0.0.1\n\tSource Port:\t\t0\n\nDetailed Authentication Information:\n\tLogon Process:\t\tUser32 \n\tAuthentication Package:\tNegotiate\n\tTransited Services:\t-\n\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\t-\n\tKey Length:\t\t0\n\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\n\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\n\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\n\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\n\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\n\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\n\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\n\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\n\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\n\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\n\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.",
    "host": {
      "name": "FOOBAZ"
    },
    "agent": {
      "ephemeral_id": "217e6bf5-ab75-4e29-918e-4ffd9ca2926f",
      "id": "da555edf-e814-4b4a-9d92-9198f0bf605b",
      "name": "FOOBAZ",
      "type": "winlogbeat",
      "version": "7.15.0",
      "hostname": "FOOBAZ"
    },
    "ecs": {
      "version": "1.11.0"
    },
    "fields": {
      "csIndex": "winlogbeat"
    },
    "messageTitle": "An account was successfully logged on.",
    "context_addition": "true",
    "winlog": {
      "opcode": "Info",
      "channel": "Security",
      "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
      "process": {
        "pid": 632,
        "thread": {
          "id": 3776
        }
      },
      "event_id": "4624",
      "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
      "api": "wineventlog",
      "version": 1,
      "activity_id": "{9FC42AA4-A829-471B-AEC1-E2FBCF5909E6}",
      "keywords": [
        "Audit Success"
      ],
      "record_id": 1427503114,
      "task": "Logon",
      "computer_name": "FOOBAZ",
      "cybersift": {
        "event.code": 4624,
        "ComputerNameNormalized": "FOOBAZ",
        "LogSenderAddress": "10.2.1.1",
        "TargetUserNameNormalized": "administrator",
        "TargetUserType": "user",
        "SubjectUserNameNormalized": "FOOBAZ$",
        "SubjectUserType": "computer",
        "LoginInfo": {
          "DestinationName": "FOOBAZ",
          "SourceAddress": "127.0.0.1",
          "DestinationAddress": "127.0.0.1",
          "SourceName": "FOOBAZ"
        },
        "LogonTypeText": "Interactive",
        "mitre": [
          {
            "name": "SID-History Injection",
            "id": "T1178",
            "tactic": "Privilege Escalation"
          }
        ],
        "citrix": {},
        "HighPrivilegedUser": true,
        "HighPrivilegedUserGroup": "Enterprise Admins",
        "messageTitle": "An account was successfully logged on."
      },
      "LogSenderAddress": "10.2.1.1",
      "event_data": {
        "IpPort": "0",
        "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-2224737262-2903874594-3848241394-500",
        "LogonType": "2",
        "TransmittedServices": "-",
        "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
        "WorkstationName": "FOOBAZ",
        "IpAddress": "127.0.0.1",
        "LogonGuid": "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}",
        "ProcessId": "0x234",
        "SubjectDomainName": "WORKGROUP",
        "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
        "AuthenticationPackageName": "Negotiate",
        "TargetLogonId": "0x1bf7da",
        "LogonProcessName": "User32 ",
        "TargetUserName": "Administrator",
        "LmPackageName": "-",
        "KeyLength": "0",
        "ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe",
        "TargetDomainName": "FOOBAZ",
        "ImpersonationLevel": "%%1833",
        "SubjectUserName": "FOOBAZ$",
        "TargetUserNameNormalized": "administrator",
        "TargetUserType": "user",
        "SubjectUserNameNormalized": "FOOBAZ$",
        "SubjectUserType": "computer",
        "LogonTypeText": "Interactive"
      }
    },
    "time": "15:08:58"
  }


Example [Tuning Alerts]

To Tune an alert, you first use the title field and the matching field. For example, if I wanted to filter out any Liveliness check failed alert matching the host field ‘Cybersift’ my query would be

Query Log Source: Alerts

JMESPath:

title=='Liveliness check failed' && host=='CyberSift'

{
  "@timestamp": "2026-07-02T01:04:22.635Z",
  "title": "Liveliness check failed",
  "description": "Host CyberSift has not sent any logs in the past 0.5 hours",
  "severity": "high",
  "samples_links": "UNKNOWN",
  "host": "CyberSift",
  "details": "Host CyberSift has not sent any logs in the past 0.5 hours",
  "es_id": "cbc065e8-f72a-4d93-80e3-967c1b5a824c",
  "original": {},
  "tags": [
    "infra",
    "linux",
    "anomaly",
    "liveliness"
  ],
  "time": "01:04:32"
}




tags:

  • Rule Management

  • Cybersift Detection Rules

  • Filtering Rules

  • Tune Alerts

  • Remove Alerts

  • Disable / Delete Alerts